


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
18 April 1962



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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18 April 1962

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN**

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

18 April 1962

## DAILY BRIEF

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France: At the 13 April meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the French Government refused to accept proposed guidelines governing conditions under which NATO would use nuclear weapons in self-defense. The German permanent representative to NATO views the French rejection of the proposals as France's most significant anti-NATO action to date and one which threatens to split the alliance. General Norstadt, however, considers it part of a pattern rather than an especially significant step in itself. All NATO countries except France backed the guidelines as a major step toward the organization and control of NATO nuclear defense.]

[Paris objected particularly to references in the guidelines to US consultation with other NATO countries before nuclear retaliation against a Soviet attack because this would inhibit the effective use of nuclear weapons by the US. France's opposition to the proposals is another example of its intention to make cooperation with the US dependent on a modification of US nuclear aid policy; it also reflects doubts of American determination to defend Europe. NATO Secretary General Stikker hopes to de-emphasize a split at the forthcoming ministerial meetings in Athens by avoiding a vote on the guidelines and only reporting acceptance by the other 14 countries of the principle of consultation. Paris, however, may choose to make an issue of the guidelines at the Athens meetings.]

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Communist China: In a 16 April statement, Peiping denounced the presence of a US naval vessel in waters off the north China naval base of Tsingtao as a "new and graver" provocation. The statement amplifies Peiping's 197th and 198th "serious warnings" and marks the first time in nearly two years that the Chinese Communists have made more than a pro forma denunciation of alleged US provocations. The Chinese Communists linked the purported intrusion with recent US activities to "intensify tension in the Taiwan Strait." Peiping charges that the "Chiang Kai-shek clique" has taken advantage of these activities to step up planning for a return to the mainland. Peiping's effort to couple Chinese Nationalist preparations with US actions may signal an intensification of Chinese Communist propaganda against Taipei and the US. At the recent National People's Congress in Peiping, Premier Chou En-lai called for "heightened vigilance" against both Chinese Nationalist "sabotage activities" and US "military provocations and war threats." [REDACTED]

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USSR-China: Chou En-lai's failure to modify Chinese positions in dispute with the Soviet Union in his speech to the National People's Congress and the pointed refusal of the Chinese delegate to the 14th Soviet Komsomol Congress to applaud a Soviet attack on Albania point up the continued disagreement between the two Communist powers and indicate that the fundamental problems which divide them are not near resolution. Nevertheless, both sides have recently attempted to present a picture of harmony by stressing their "unity" and muting somewhat the polemical tone of their exchanges. As part of this attempt, some improvement in Sino-Soviet economic relations may result from the current Sino-Soviet economic talks in Peiping, although at present there are few indications of this.

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Ghana: Vigorous attacks on Minister of Industries Edusei published in the Convention People's party (CPP) newspaper since 13 April appear to be part of a new move by Nkrumah to break up existing or potential opposition and strengthen his authoritarian control. Edusei, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is the most important remaining representative of the regime's "old guard," which has been largely displaced during the past year by younger and more militant leaders, many of whom are Communist-influenced. Despite his long service as chief hatchetman for the CPP, Edusei probably enjoys a wider popular following, particularly in his native Ashanti region, than any other Ghanaian official besides Nkrumah. A showdown at this time would indicate that Nkrumah feels he no longer needs Edusei to keep the Ashanti region in line; this area has long been the principal center of opposition to the CPP regime. Edusei now is in Britain on a "private business trip" possibly connected with the unfavorable publicity which his wife, who has lived in London for some time, has recently attracted by purchasing a gold-plated bed. [REDACTED]

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Bolivia: Leaders of the governing leftist Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) are reported to have been considering staging a fake rightist revolt against their government to rally support to the MNR prior to the congressional elections scheduled for 3 June. The MNR government has repeatedly staged such "revolts." However, President Paz may have decided that the current anti-Chilean agitation over the Lauca River will provide the necessary rallying spirit.

Although the MNR is confident of winning the elections, it is reportedly afraid that anti-MNR sentiment in the country will give the party less than the 70-80 percent majority it has received in the last three elections and that such evidence of decreased popular support will have an unfavorable effect on

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relations with the United States and other Western sources of foreign economic assistance. Accusations against the rightist opposition and at least some arrests are likely in the next two months.

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Dominican Republic: The National Civic Union--the country's largest political party--in a move to dissociate itself from the ruling Council of State, has asked its members to resign from top positions in the government. The UCN has been increasingly critical of the council, in part because of the council's hesitancy in carrying out reforms, especially the purge of military officers guilty of crimes committed under the dictatorship. UCN leaders have been closely identified with the government but in fact are unable to control its policies and now apparently feel that they must make a break with the council in preparation for the national elections scheduled in December. In the event the UCN officials refused to resign their government positions, the party could be weakened and there would be further political fragmentation among moderates, thus increasing opportunities for political gain by Communist-influenced and pro-Castro parties.

\*A military plot uncovered by officers loyal to the government, according to a Santo Domingo broadcast on 18 April, probably reflects unrest among reactionary elements of the armed forces who fear action against them as a result of threatened UCN pressure.

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### Sino-Soviet Relations

The manifestations of adjustment that have been noted are as yet surface ones. The Soviet Union has republished two People's Daily editorials, and stress on "cooperation" has appeared in material, published by both sides, which evokes vague impressions of scientific and technical collaboration. The two editorials, however, were carefully chosen: one showed the Chinese economy in a bad light and could be taken as support for Soviet views on economic development, and the other was skillfully doctored by deletions so as to appear closer to Soviet positions on disarmament than is actually the case.

The Soviet delegation which arrived in Peiping on 13 April to complete negotiations on "trade and economic matters" for 1962 is headed by Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev and is about the same level as last year's delegation. The tone of the speeches given by both delegation heads at a reception for Patolichev was warm, although not as effusive as last year, and the emphasis was on mutual cooperation. The presence in the delegation of a vice chairman from the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations and references to "other economic matters," in addition to trade, suggest that the sharply curtailed program of Soviet aid to China is being discussed. It is unlikely that any significant improvement in this program will be negotiated. Recent bloc trade pronouncements indicate that Soviet trade with China this year is expected to total less than \$1.1 billion--about half the peak year of 1959.

Along with these indications of a desire to present a better picture of the relationship, differences continue to appear. Soviet ideological broadcasts to China in Mandarin, although now more moderate in tone than in the recent past, continue to express Soviet views on peaceful coexistence and other Soviet positions in opposition to Chinese views. Each side has demonstrated that its position on Albania remains unchanged. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko is visiting Yugoslavia, while Chinese enmity toward that country is continuing. Differing interpretations from each side on such international developments as the cease-fire in Algeria and Castro's dismissal of veteran Communist Anibal Escalante indicate that no movement toward like views has occurred.



### Ghanaian Minister Under Attack

The campaign against Edusei in the party press, which is under the immediate control of some of the most militant left-wingers and pro-Communists in the Nkrumah regime, has revolved about the charge that Edusei is not complying with Nkrumah's strictures against accumulations of wealth by government officials. Much attention is focused on the minister's new home in Accra--described as the most ostentatious in the country--as well as on his wife's extravagances. The conclusion is drawn that such behavior is particularly unbecoming in a member of a government pledged to "socialism." President Nkrumah made similar charges in dismissing two other stalwarts of the "old guard"--K. A. Gbedemah and Kojo Botsio--from the cabinet last fall. Criticism of high living by officials is the most widespread popular complaint against the government.

The initial anti-Edusei editorial suggested that "facts" were being gathered against "other party leaders," who, if guilty, would be brought to "equally swift justice." Other "old guard" elements remaining in the cabinet are Minister for Construction and Communications E. K. Bensah and Minister for Health I. K. Inkumsah, neither of whom is a politically significant figure. Edusei's fall would reduce the number of ministers regarded as having major influence within the regime to three: Minister of Information and Broadcasting Adamafio, Minister of Interior Boateng, and Minister of Defense Baako. Adamafio and Boateng are unfriendly to the West and advocate close cooperation with the Sino-Soviet bloc, while Baako, who appears to be more in Nkrumah's personal confidence than any other Ghanaian politician, is regarded by the embassy in Accra as a slavish alter ego of Nkrumah.

One of the main purposes of Nkrumah's visit to the Ashanti region last month was probably to test the long-standing dogma that the regime's control of the area is essentially dependent on Edusei. Nkrumah deliberately chose the occasion to make

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major pronouncements on preventive detention and the conduct of trade unions--all of which contained stern warnings designed to convince his audience of the government's continued readiness to crush any signs of disaffection. At the same time, Nkrumah wrote off the weak, Ashanti-based opposition United party as already "defunct" and endorsed the objective of making Ghana a one-party state in form as well as in fact. [Subsequently, he has been reported planning a national referendum in mid-June aimed at obtaining popular approval for a one-party system]

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